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BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This appeal is from the trial court's Amended Order Supplementing Bifurcated 
Decree of Divorce (hereafter "Order" (Addendum at ADD 1-12)). This Court has 
jurisdiction over the appeal under UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-2a-3(2)(h) (2002). 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
The following issues are presented for review: 
1. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in giving Mr. Carsten only 30 percent 
parent-time in its award of joint custody of the parties' two children? 
Mr. Carsten preserved that issue for review in his motion and memorandum asking 
that the court set aside the judgment or, in the alternative, amend the judgment or grant a 
new trial. (R. 426-45). 
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2. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in its calculations for imputed income 
that provided the basis for its award of alimony to Mrs. Carsten and in its structuring of 
that award? 
Mr. Carsten preserved that issue for review in his motion and memorandum asking 
that the court set aside the judgment or, in the alternative, amend the judgment or grant a 
new trial. (R. 426-45). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
There are no constitutional or statutory provisions, or rules, that are 
determinative in this appeal. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Procedural History 
A bifurcated decree of divorce was entered in this case on March 23, 2005, nunc 
pro tunc to December 31, 2004. Order 2 (ADD 2). The parties had two boys during the 
marriage, one bom in 1996 and the other in 1999. Id. A trial was held on August 11,12 
and 17, 2005, at which the trial court was to decide a number of issues, including custody 
of the children and alimony. The court issued a memorandum decision on August 19, 
2005, in which it set forth both its findings of fact and its conclusions. (R. 394-421) 
(hereafter "Mem. Dec") (Addendum at ADD 13-40). Thereafter, on January 24, 2006, 
the court entered its Order, from which this appeal is taken. (ADD 1-12). 
B. Trial Court's Findings 
Regarding the issues presented on appeal, which relate to the custody and alimony 
awards, the trial court made the following findings: 
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2. As for the children, the court makes some additional findings, 
based on the testimony and otherwise. The court realizes some of these 
"findings" are really in the nature of somewhat rambling conclusions, but 
they are included here as a basis for the court's decision and thought 
processes and the court finds them to be true. 
The court believes that the issues surrounding custody are based on 
the perceptions of the parties regarding the children, the needs of the 
children and the parties' views as to how to best deal with the children. 
3. The court finds each party loves and cares for their children and 
each wants to act in the best interests of the children. The parties simply 
cannot agree on what that is. The two children in this case are on the 
autism spectrum, though the court believes neither has been formally 
diagnosed "autistic." Even if there is such a diagnosis, the "syndrome" is 
on a spectrum. Each parent believes his or her own approach is the right 
way and the best for the children[,] but the court finds and concludes in fact 
that there is no "right" way to deal with the children in this case, or any 
children for that matter, but only a perceived right way. There is no one 
medically or scientifically or psychologically "right" way to deal with 
children with autism spectrum, despite the firmly held beliefs of a particular 
parent, and there is no one answer that fits all children on the autism 
spectrum. The process is[,] as with many other of life's challenges, to find 
some way, as best one can, that works for the children and stick with it and 
press on and take one day at a time. The court cannot solve the problems 
associated with the disagreement by parents about how to treat children 
with special needs. Professionals disagree, teachers disagree, as do parents, 
and others disagree, on how to best raise children in general, and how to 
raise children with special needs. Here, the process is more complicated 
because the court does not believe it has a full enough picture of these 
children as the facts show school work at an acceptable level[,] but there 
are other behaviors and issues that complicate the picture. 
4. "Autism" is a label attached to many behaviors[,] but it involves 
many facets of a child's life. It is not medically or psychologically 
understood[,] nor is there one solution or answer to the issues that arise in 
the life of a child on the autism spectrum nor the parents of that child [sic]. 
Many parents seek a panacea or a final solution and there are none 
currently. Research and further study continue to be necessary to try to 
solve the problems associated with a child on the autism spectrum. Autism 
can manifest itself in behavior as well as medically and emotionally. 
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5. The "regimen" desired by [Mrs. Carsten] may be effective for the 
children, but it is simply one way to approach the problems associated with 
children on the autism spectrum. The medical doctor, Bryan Jepson, M.D., 
from whom [Mrs. Carsten] takes much of her counsel, believes in a diet 
plan that involves basically avoiding grains and dairy products, though the 
court realizes it is more involved than that (gluten free and casein free). 
Education is involved as well. Other food supplements are used. Dr. 
Jepson admits his methods are not accepted by the majority of the medical 
community and are experimental, not in the sense that the methods he 
espouses are not tested by the scientific method nor have the methods been 
subjected to peer review nor are they universally accepted, as if anything is 
universally accepted. That is not a criticism of Dr. Jepson or [Mrs. 
Carsten]. However, [Mr. Carsten] cannot be faulted nor kept from the lives 
of the children because he sides with the majority of professionals, or even 
simply disagrees with Dr. Jepson and [Mrs. Carsten], that such a dietary 
regimen is not necessary nor productive. It is subjective as to whether the 
children are behaving "better," engage in more or less self-stimulating 
behavior and so on. While a mother such as [Mrs. Carsten] most certainly 
cannot be discounted when she says she can observe changes after visits 
with [Mr. Carsten], the complexity of the situation does not allow the court 
to simply say [Mr. Carsten] is wrong because he does not follow a 
particular diet. One party may see worse behavior and the other party not 
see such a phenomenon. That does not mean one party is right and the 
other wrong. The court fully credits the abilities and sincerity of [Mrs. 
Carsten] and her efforts and time spent with and for the children, but simply 
finds that the way she has chosen, and the way she thinks is best for the 
children, is not necessarily the only viable, legitimate way to deal with the 
issues surrounding the children. 
The court cannot and does not find the "best" or "right" way to deal 
with these issues. Lacking agreement of the parties, however, the court is 
required to consider the best interests of the children and order something 
that is an attempt to accomplish the goal of having a custody arrangement 
that best meets those needs of the children, whatever the wishes of the 
parents. 
* * * 
8. While the court observed some disturbing things during the trial, 
as far [as] minor "outbursts" and reactions to testimony, and what appeared 
to be coaching of witnesses by [Mrs. Carsten], snide "snickering" when the 
other testified, and vocal and voice inflection criticism by [Mr. Carsten] of 
the decisions of the other party while testifying, the court also observed 
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genuine love and caring for the children, by each party. That love was 
expressed in court and in emotion and the court sees much love shown in 
the conduct of the parents toward the children. However, love spoken by a 
parent who then "beats" the child every day or two may still be love, but it 
is different love than what is shown by a person who does not beat the 
child. (Obviously the court is not implying in any way that this case 
involves any such thing as a "beating," nor that either party "beats" the 
children. The comments are used only to illustrate the court's thinking 
relative to the support issues discussed below.) 
The court finds and concludes and believes the parties can work 
together and should work together with the purpose that the children will 
benefit. To the extent [Mrs. Carsten] believes [Mr. Carsten] is hurting the 
children by a failure to comply with her desired regimen, the court believes 
that lack of diligence should end by [Mr. Carsten] unless [he] has some 
other course of treatment that the parties can agree upon. However, on 
balance, the court finds that it is of more benefit to the children to have both 
parents in their lives than it is to have a particular diet or treatment regimen, 
no matter how strongly one party feels about the diet or regimen. While the 
court is aware that love and hugs alone cannot overcome many "autistic" 
behaviors, the court believes a child on the autism spectrum (or any child) 
cannot have too many people in his life that love him, and spend time with 
him and do things with him. 
9. The court accepts the subjective observations of the parties, but 
from the testimony and common sense, the children and their conditions are 
too "multi-factorial" (in the words of Dr. Jepson) to be able to isolate a 
"symptom" of increase[d] self-stimulation, for example, after eating 
something not on the "allowed" diet. Behavior is simply more complex 
than that where special needs children are involved and behavior cannot be 
solely tied to an instance of failure of diet. 
10. None of this is a criticism nor is it profound wisdom, and the 
court believes it is mostly common sense and experience, but the above 
comments are largely a background and serve as a basis for the court's 
finding and conclusion that there ought to be joint legal custody, with 
primary physical custody being awarded to [Mrs. Carsten] but with ample 
physical custody to [Mr. Carsten]. The court will further explain the 
reasons for that less-than-equal physical custody in a discussion of the 
payment of support by [Mr. Carsten]. 
The court finds the parties can work together and it is in the best 
interests of the children to have joint legal custody. The court finds that 
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[Mrs. Carsten] has been the primary party involved in raising the children, 
and [Mr. Carsten] was working full time and providing the finances. The 
court finds, and the parties agree, that [Mr. Carsten] has been involved in 
the lives of the children in the past when the parties were together. The 
court finds and believes that each party will give first priority to the welfare 
of the children, reach shared decisions, and each can encourage a 
relationship with the other parent. There have been serious disagreements 
about various child-rearing issues in the past[,] but the court finds the 
parties can, and must, overcome those past disagreements. 
11. Unless the parties agree otherwise, the court finds it in the best 
interests of the children that they be with [Mrs. Carsten] approximately 
70% of the time and with [Mr. Carsten] 30% of the time. Again, the court 
will make findings and discuss why, despite the court's comments above, 
that time is not more equally shared. The court will not attempt to set a 
schedule^] but it should be regular and ongoing with the time allocated 
year round. 
* * * 
13. [Mrs. Carsten] has worked as a certified appraiser of real 
property in the past and could do so again on her own schedule and be 
available for the children yet she can earn an income. Based on the 
testimony, the court finds petitioner should be imputed an income of 
$31,000 per year, or $2583 per month. While higher figures could be 
imputed, those higher possible incomes assume facts the court cannot 
accept. The ability to earn an income from appraising assumes a client 
base, and assumes the ability to work long hours. [Mrs. Carsten] has been 
earning some money and borrowing some money. With this job she can 
work from the home on a flexible schedule and accomplish many of the 
goals set for the children, yet be earning a reasonable income. 
14. [Mr. Carsten] was ordered to pay one half his "income" to [Mrs. 
Carsten] during the pendency of this case, from May 2004 to the present 
trial. A great deal of testimony was elicited about various facts of [Mr. 
Carsten's] income and expenses, and in his testimony he admitted and 
agreed that he was willing to pay "more" because he did not understand 
exactly what was required and some of his "deductions" could be 
eliminated. He voluntarily eliminated some of his expenses before trial. 
His counsel characterized this as generous and fair and equitable. 
15. The court does not intend to go through each and every expense 
category and determine whether the expense was a legitimate expense in 
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arriving at what his income was for purposes of support. The court has 
examined the exhibits and considered the testimony carefully and has 
determined that the court is incapable, as are the accountants except by way 
of opinion, of determining exactly what his "true" income was during the 
pendency of this case. The court heard experts in this case and has heard 
many accounting experts. Accounting is not an exact science by any means 
and varying conclusions can be and often are drawn by qualified CPAs. 
The statutory definition of gross income from self employment is 
well known, and it is arrived at by subtracting necessary expenses required 
for self employment from gross receipts. The court is to review those and 
only necessary expenses may be deducted from gross receipts. Tax 
purposes do not govern. Here, the court finds [Mr. Carsten] has not paid 
half his income and has overstated his reasonable and necessary expenses 
and that has resulted in an under payment [sic] to [Mrs. Carsten] for family 
support. The court cannot and does not, however, attempt to calculate what 
the amount is. The court believes on balance the court's only solution is go 
forward from this point. 
16. The court finds that while [Mr. Carsten] loves the children as 
discussed above, for some reason, perhaps dissatisfaction with [Mrs. 
Carsten] or perhaps simple greed or some other unsatisfactory or base 
motive, he has not fully supported them as he could have during the 
pendency of this case. The court cannot and does not equate that [to] the 
hypothetical "beatings" discussed above, but the sheer weight of the lack of 
support and all that encompasses as far as an attitude or mind set, 
overcomes, in the mind of the court, the great expressed love of [Mr. 
Carsten]. 
Whatever the calculations involved, [Mr. Carsten] certainly took 
almost every advantage he could to "deduct" from his gross receipts what 
he calls necessary expenses before paying half that to [Mrs. Carsten]. The 
court is not at all impressed that an accountant "approved" the deductions 
or that it is legal as far as taxes, or that it is permissible. In fact it was not 
"accountant approved" in any event as the accountant for [Mr. Carsten] told 
[him] what was permissible and then [Mr. Carsten] gave figures to the 
accountant, who assumed the honesty and good will of [Mr. Carsten]. The 
court does not engage in that presumption based on the testimony received 
and the exhibits examined carefully by the court. The deductions in this 
case involve a practice the court greatly faults and as a result, in part, [Mr. 
Carsten] is not given more parent time[,] as it appears that it may not be in 
the best interests of the children as the court is less certain that it would 
otherwise be that he has the best interests of the children at heart in his very 
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core and heart. He seems capable and caring, but these economic issues 
cause the court to be somewhat wary of his true commitment to the 
children. He had a chance to prove his love for his children by supporting 
them and giving them all he possibly could, not by giving them half of what 
the definition of "income" allows according to accounting principles. He 
could have done far more than he did, whatever the amount "should" have 
been, and he failed to do that. That speaks loudly to the court, more loudly 
than his expressed love. Instead, he deducted and expensed almost every 
conceivable item from gross receipts and then paid support from that 
income. While he may have done that because of his feelings, toward [Mrs. 
Carsten], and out of frustration and bitterness or ill will, it could have, and 
almost certainly did, have consequences for the children. As a further 
comment on [Mr. Carsten's] payments, [Mrs. Carsten's] records show he 
paid just under $600 per month since early 2004. The exhibits show [Mr. 
Carsten] calculated, seemingly to the very penny, half of what he perceived 
to be his income. Several checks are in the amount of $210.39 with the 
notation "1/2 pay check." Most checks paid to [Mrs. Carsten] bear that 
notation. The checks written to [Mrs. Carsten], even in a self-employment 
situation in a start-up business, show [Mr. Carsten] wrote the checks for 
$163.63, $25.98, $44.16, and on and on. Very, very few checks were in an 
even amount but were calculated, as noted, to the penney [sic], evidently 
being careful not to "overpay" for the benefit of the children. 
In total, and in sum, the entire phenomenon of this "income" and 
"necessary expense" was distasteful to the court as it was presented. 
Giving [Mr. Carsten] every benefit of the doubt, and realizing he paid for 
some things not set forth by [Mrs. Carsten], the court believes this action 
belies to some extent [Mr. Carsten's] claimed good motives. The legal 
definition of income is what it is, but that does not mean a parent claiming 
to love his children must use the sharpest pencil and even sharper business 
practice to calculate his expenses to take those from the gross receipts and 
thus pay less for support for the children. There were two months when 
[Mr. Carsten] paid absolutely nothing for support, yet had gross receipts. 
The court cannot imagine what [Mr. Carsten] must have been thinking, 
other than, as mentioned, his distaste for [Mrs. Carsten] or his greed, when 
he would travel, eat out, buy items, and then not pay anything for the 
benefit of the children. His expressed, and demonstrated, love for the 
children is somewhat belied by the perhaps legal but unsavory "accounting" 
principles utilized. It is particularly surprising given that the court credits 
[Mr. Carsten] with being very generous at trial in agreeing to certain 
aspects financially that do not favor him. The court believes and concludes 
that as trial approached [Mr. Carsten] realized fully what he had been 
doing, cheating the children. 
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17. The court finds that while small amounts may not mean much 
economically, they are telling to the court about an attitude of [Mr. 
Carsten]. Again, the court finds and believes fully [Mr. Carsten] appears to 
be well intentioned and sincere about his love for the children, and he wants 
them and needs them in his life, but he let other factors get in the way of 
being more generous and fair than he could have during the pendency of 
this case. He felt it necessary to deduct, for example, $15 for parking fees, 
when that measly and minor $15 could have been used for the boys to have 
a small gift or treat of some kind. He deducted car washes, all available 
mileage, all accounting fees, paid his adult sons from a previous marriage a 
directors fee in total of $3000 (but did not claim this as an expense), paid 
those same adult sons wages over $7500, many, many meals including 
meals for, as an example, $162 and $137 at Costco (the court's experience 
at Costco is that one can enjoy hotdogs and pizza but little else by way of 
meals there), office supplies, flights that are questionable, postage, and 
other expenses. Again, without attempting to determine specifically any 
legitimate expense, and without suggesting that any particular item is or is 
not a necessary expense to be deducted from gross receipts, the entire 
picture shows a person more interested in paying as little as he can for 
family support. It certainly, beyond question, does not show a person 
willing to pay what ever [sic] he can to make the lives of his children better 
and more enjoyable. When asked how he thought [Mrs. Carsten] and the 
children could make it with such small amounts of support, his answer was 
a rather, to the court, cavalier response that she seemed to have made it. 
The court does not enjoy denigrating [Mr. Carsten], as he seems to have 
many, many good qualities, but these observations and conclusions play a 
large part in the court's perception of just how dedicated a father [Mr. 
Carsten] is. 
* * * 
Again, the most important factor is not whether the law or accounting 
principles allow a billiard table to be deducted, or a meal at Costco, or 
certain mileage, or anything else. The important factor is that [Mr. Carsten] 
believed he should or could deduct an item, rather than simply pay money 
for his children's benefit. He did not do so and that fact and factor weighs 
far more heavily in the court's mind than any amounts that may be past due 
for failing to abide by the May, 2004 order. The picture presented is of a 
man who realizes the law is what it is and sets out to earn money and see 
how little he can pay to his family based on the expenses he deems 
necessary. If that is too harsh, it most certainly does not present a picture 
of a man who sets out to see how much he can benefit his children by 
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paying all he can possibly pay. Based on that in part, the court is not 
awarding equal parent time. The court does not believe the conduct is 
contemptuous under the law. The court, again, does not and will not 
attempt to determine what amounts may be due. 
* * * 
24. As to alimony, the court finds that [Mrs. Carsten] can earn as 
indicated after a period of time. The court believes that she cannot earn 
$2583 per month initially as she still has needs for equipment to re-start her 
business and it will take time to reestablish that income level. She needs to 
seek and obtain clients. There was testimony from [Mrs. Carsten] that she 
needs $10,000 to obtain the necessary equipment and supplies to re-start 
her business[,] but there was testimony from others that $3000 could start 
an appraisal business. Given that [Mrs. Carsten] was previously involved 
in the appraisal business, the court finds that $5000 is sufficient to re-start 
her business and that she has some equipment purchased with funds that 
have created debt. 
Mem. Dec. 3-22 (ADD 15-34). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
In awarding joint custody of the children, the trial court abused its discretion in 
splitting parenting time between the parties so that Mr. Carsten receives only 30 percent 
of that time and Mrs. Carsten receives 70 percent. That unequal split clearly constituted 
improper punishment of Mr. Carsten for employing what the trial court believed were 
unsavory (but not illegal) accounting practices in his business. The court failed to set 
forth any logical connection between the reduced parenting time for Mr. Carsten and the 
best interests of the children. 
The trial court also abused its discretion in awarding alimony to Mrs. Carsten in 
amounts calculated for the first two years. Those calculations are not supported by the 
record. More particularly, the court improperly used anticipated income figures for Mrs. 
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Carsten for the first two years that were well below the imputed annual income of 
$31,000 for Mrs. Carsten, a figure which the court used in calculating alimony for the 
third year on (a figure which is supported by the record evidence; the lower income 
figures used for the first two years are not supported by the record). 
ARGUMENT 
A. The trial court abused its discretion in giving Mr. Carsten only a 30 percent 
share of the joint custody of the parties' two children. 
1. Introduction 
The trial court awarded the parties "joint legal custody of the two (2) minor 
children with primary physical custody awarded to [Mrs. Carsten] with [Mr. Carsten] to 
receive liberal parent-time of thirty percent (30%) of the time[,] which shall include 
statutory holidays and summer parent-time." Order 2 (ADD 2). As is clear from the 
court's findings in support of that order, the only reason for the unequal split of physical 
custody was the court's finding that Mr. Carsten had used "legal but unsavory 
'accounting' principles" in calculating the income for his business - viz, he had 
aggressively taken deductions for expenses, which reduced his business's net income, 
which in turn reduced the amount of money he paid in family support pursuant to the 
court's May 2004 order. Although repeatedly saying it was unable to calculate the 
amount the net income was reduced by the deductions it believed were marginal, the 
court concluded that Mr. Carsten's aggressive accounting practices had resulted in the 
children receiving less than they might have under the court's May 2004 order requiring 
him to pay one-half of his "income" to Mrs. Carsten as family support between that date 
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and the date of the trial. Without making any substantive findings on the point, the court 
speculated that the lower payments from Mr. Carsten "could have, and almost certainly 
did, have consequences for the children." 
The court's solution for the perceived underpayment by Mr. Carsten was to deny 
him equal custody of his children, rather than to order him to pay the amount necessary to 
eliminate the shortfall. For the following reasons, that was an abuse of discretion. 
2. Standard of Review 
A trial court's custody award is reviewed for abuse of discretion. Huderna v. 
Carpenter, 1999 UT App 290, f 21,989 P.2d 491. 
3. In making its custody determination, the trial court improperly 
punished Mr. Carsten for his accounting practices. 
Trial courts are afforded broad discretion in determining child custody. Tucker v. 
Tucker, 910 P.2d 1209, 1214 (Utah 1996). This court will not disturb a custody award 
unless "'the trial court's judgment is so flagrantly unjust as to be an abuse of discretion/" 
Id. (quoting Shioji v. Shioji, 712 P.2d 197, 201 (Utah 1985)). "However, while the trial 
court has broad discretion, it must be guided at all times by the best interests of the 
child." Id:, see also Paryzek v. Paryzek, 776 P.2d 78, 81 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
Accordingly, "trial courts must not reward or punish parents for their conduct during a 
marital relationship through a custody award." Deeben v. Deeben, 772 P.2d 972, 974 n. 4 
(Utah Ct. App. 1989); see also Davis v. Davis, 749 P.2d 647, 648 (Utah 1988) ("The law 
does not, when determining custody of a child, attempt to reward or punish one parent or 
the other."). 
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Here, in splitting custody 70/30 in favor of Mrs. Carsten, the trial court clearly 
sought to punish Mr. Carsten for employing accounting practices in his business that the 
court found "unsavory" but not illegal. Although the court speculated that the children 
must have been hurt by those practices, even though the court acknowledged that it could 
not calculate just how much money the children were denied, it made no finding of any 
actual harm. Further, although the court concluded that Mr. Carsten's accounting 
practices called into question his commitment as a father (because by employing those 
practices and reducing his income, which reduced the amount he paid to Mrs. Carsten in 
family support pursuant to the May 2004 order, he effectively was cheating his children), 
the court made no finding that Mr. Carsten had exhibited any behavior that showed a lack 
of commitment to the children when they were in his custody. Indeed, the court 
expressly found that "each party will give first priority to the welfare of the children," 
and it repeatedly noted that Mr. Carsten was a good father. 
In short, the court failed to explain how a reduction in Mr. Carsten's physical 
custody of the children, which means they spend less time with a loving father, is in the 
best interests of the children. The court imposed that penalty on Mr. Carsten not because 
the children's interests would be enhanced by less time with him, but instead to punish 
him for a perceived failure to comply with the spirit of the May 2004 order to pay one-
half of his income to Mrs. Carsten. The court did so in, the face of Mr. Carsten's express 
offer to pay Mrs. Carsten whatever amount the court determined had been underpaid due 
to his accounting practices. (Tr. 496). Given that that offer provided an obvious and fair 
solution to the problem the court had with Mr. Carsten's accounting, its decision to deal 
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with his ill-advised business deductions by awarding unequal custody of the children 
amounts to a clear abuse of discretion. That is particularly so in light of the court's 
failure to identify any logical connection between reduced custody for Mr. Carsten and 
the best interests of the children. 
Specifically, how would the children benefit as a result of giving him only 30 
percent custody? If indeed Mr. Carsten was guilty of an underpayment, whether small or 
large, the children clearly would benefit by requiring him to pay the amount of the 
underpayment. On the other hand, there is nothing in this record to suggest they will 
benefit from the court's limitation of their time with their father. Because the trial court 
relied solely on Mr. Carsten's debatable accounting practices as the basis for its unequal 
custody award, and because that award is clearly designed to punish Mr. Carsten for that 
conduct rather than promote the best interests of the children, this Court should reverse 
the custody award and remand with instructions that an order for equal joint custody be 
entered. 
B. The trial court abused its discretion in its calculations for imputed income 
that provided the basis for its award of alimony to Mrs. Carsten and its 
structuring of that award. 
1. Introduction 
At trial, Mrs. Carsten, who lives in Park City, testified that she is a state certified 
real estate appraiser. (Tr. 6, 47). She was not then working as such, only as a childcare 
provider out of her home. (Tr. 65). She estimated that she could make between $3,100 
and $3,300 a month if she went back to work as an independent real estate (residential) 
appraiser (she had left that line of work in 2001 to stay home with her children), but that 
14 
"it would take time to do that." (Tr. 57). She believed it would cost $10,000 to purchase 
the necessary equipment and supplies to start her business. (Tr. 148). She said that the 
fee for a standard appraisal is $300 to $350. (Tr. 185). When she was doing appraisals, 
only about one-third of her time was spent in the field. (Tr. 48). 
Two state certified real estate appraisers testified at trial. One of those appraisers, 
Jerry Webber, a witness for Mrs. Carsten, said that a certified appraiser (1) could 
purchase all of the necessary equipment for an appraisal business and also pay the 
required licensing fees for approximately $3,000, (2) could perform ten to fifteen 
appraisals a week, and (3) could charge between $250 and $350 per appraisal. (Tr. 268-
72). Webber also said that a residential appraisal typically requires about one hour on 
site and then three to four hours to prepare the appraisal report, but that it would be more 
difficult for an appraiser to do that if he or she were a single parent with two children. 
(Tr. 280-81). 
The other appraiser, Randy Millett, a witness for Mr. Carsten, testified that a 
certified appraiser could get an appraisal business up and running for a minimum of 
approximately $3,000. (Tr. 559). As a certified residential appraiser in the Park City 
area, he does around ten appraisals per week, and the "standard fee can range between 
$350 and $450 and on up to over $1,000, depending on the value." (Id.). 
On that record, the trial court imputed an annual income of $31,000 as an 
independent appraiser to Mrs. Carsten but found that she could not earn that amount right 
away. Mem. Dec. 22 (ADD 34). More particularly, it found that Mrs. Carsten "can earn 
approximately $1500 per month the first year of her business, the sum of approximately 
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$2000 [per month] the second year and thereafter the amount imputed." Mem. Dec. 23 
(ADD 35). Based on that formula, the court ultimately awarded alimony to Mrs. Carsten 
in the amount of "$2,321.00 per month for twelve (12) months commencing September 1, 
2005, $1,821.00 per month commencing September 1, 2006[J and $1,238.00 per month 
thereafter." Order 7 (ADD 7). For the following reasons, the court abused its discretion 
in making that alimony award. 
2. Standard of review 
Trial courts are afforded considerable discretion in awarding alimony, and this 
court will not overturn an award absent a clear abuse of discretion. Davis v. Davis, 2003 
UT App 282,17, 76P.3d716. 
3. The record does not support the court's alimony award for the first 
two years. 
Without any evidence to support its findings that Mrs. Carsten would make only 
about $12,000 in the first year of her appraisal business and only about $24,000 in the 
second year, the court nevertheless calculated the alimony award to Mrs. Carsten based 
on those findings. Only for the third year of Mrs. Carsten's business did the court use the 
imputed income figure of $31,000, which concededly was supported by some evidence 
presented at trial (but nonetheless seemed rather low given the appraisers' testimony that 
typically an appraiser could complete approximately ten to fifteen appraisals a week for a 
fee ranging from $250 to $450 for each appraisal). Because the lower income figures for 
Mrs. Carsten for the first two years are not supported by the record, the court abused its 
discretion in calculating the $2,321.00 per month and $1,821.00 per month alimony 
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obligations for the first and second years respectively. The $1,238.00 per month alimony 
figure the court calculated for the third year on (based on the $31,000 imputed income 
figure, which is supported by the record) therefore should have been the figure for the 
first two years as well. 
Accordingly, this Court should reverse the alimony award and remand to the trial 
court with instructions to modify the alimony award so that Mr. Carsten is required to pay 
only $1,238.00 per month in the first two years. There is no basis for the higher figures 
the trial court has awarded for the first two years. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing arguments, this Court should reverse the trial court's 
custody award and its alimony award, and remand the case for modification of those 
awards as indicated above. 
STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT 
Because the Court likely would benefit from a discussion of the issues with the 
parties, oral argument is requested. 
Dated this IQ> day of October 2006 
CHRISTINA I. MILLER 
MILLER VANCE & THOMPSON PC 
Attorneys for Respondent-Appellant 
Brian Carsten 
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DECREE OF DIVORCE 
Civil No. 03 450 0255 
Judge: Bruci <_ Lubuk 
111 < ili i n illi 1 liMlIi ii dim In loic ih< i uiul foi ndhiii uii'iisl 1 I k i l l 1U0S the 
1 Joiinrable Brace C, Labeck presiding. The Petitioner was present and represented by counsel, 
J 11 I J 1 Jo low it/ Respondent was present and represented by counsel, Christine Inge Miller. 
The Court, having heard the testimony of the parties, accountants, real estate npprais i nul it"« ml 
and having read the deposition of Dr. Bryan Jepson the children's autistic physician, and having 
marked and received documentary evidence ai ilif » uni hi \ <•! iii iinii'iil 1 4 lln i lli ului 
advisement for consideration of the evidence and arguments of counsel prior to rendering any 
d m 1 ion Pin i ml lliui i < mil ii Mi mui JIMIIIIII J in IMOII im HII II l l1' (H h and Petitioner 
prepared and submitted an Order Supplementing Bifurcated Decree of Divorce which this Court 
signed and entered on October 5, 2005. On October 6, 2005, Respondent filed a Request for 
Clarification as well as an Objection to the Supplemental Order. On October 12, 2005 Respondent 
filed a Motion to Set Aside the Supplemental Order. This Court heard these issues at a hearing on 
November 14, 2005 and hereby adopts this Amended Order with revisions to paragraphs 3,4 6, 8, 
15,18,19,31 and 32 into this present Amended Order Supplementing Bifurcated Decree of Divorce 
effecting the rulings of the Court as expressed in its Ruling and Order of November 17, 2005. 
Accordingly, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED ADJUDGED AND DECREED as follows: 
1. Decree of Divorce: A bifurcated Decree of Divorce was entered on March 23, 
2005, nun pro tunc to December 31, 2004. 
2. Children: Two (2) children have been born as issue of this marriage, to wit: Grant 
M. Carsten, bom on October 28, 1996 and David O. Carsten, bom on March 10, 1999. 
3. Custody and Parent-Time: The parties are awarded joint legal custody of the 
two (2) minor children with primary physical custody awarded to Petitioner with Respondent to 
receive liberal parent-time of thirty per cent (30%) of the time which shall include statutory holidays 
and summer parent-time. 
4. Final Decision Making Authority: Petitioner and Respondent shall discuss and 
attempt to reach an agreement on all issues relating to the children and the parties shall execute and 
comply with the provisions of the Joint Parenting Plan attached as Exhibit 1, hereto. If the parties 
are unable to reach an agreement, they should attend mediation, at a joint cost, with an agTeed upon 
mediator and attempt to reach an agreement prior to returning to Court for a decision. 
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5 I elephone Contact and Conduct: Each party shall be allowed reasonable and 
unmonitored telephone contact with the children and the ch ildrrn iriiuy .ill i in 111 c i iiuine nil iiyii ie 
without restriction. Both parties shall facilitate telephone calls from the children to the other parent. 
When i xnvv mm iHlqilioniP i mil mi I " m I I  i lllllli h i h l i n i i a i III 11 • i • I > I  1.1-11 IIII I n in . p u il II11 ill n l l l n m t h e r 
party's privacy and schedule. Neither party shall denigrate the children or the other parent to the 
her presence. 
6. Holiday Parenting Time: The parties shall equally share recognized state and 
federal holidays with the children as agreed upon by the parties. In the event the parties are unable 
to agree, each party should be awarded holiday !uin'1,iiii|i ipir |MM ' n "i1 '< "',' !0 1 1" <i 1 - ' n h 
Code. In addition, the children should spend Petitioner's birthday with her every year and the 
children should spend Respoi idei it s bii tl ida> it'll, him e 1 er > y ear. 
7. Summer Parenting Time: During the children's summer vacations from school, 
iht [laiin s sh.ill 1 milium1 vw.n i sing regular parenting time, Each party shall be allowed to spend 
lip to four (4) weeks with the children (two weeks uninterrupted and two (2) weeks subject to the 
: tl : "i [ 1: 1:3 :,l,s parenting time) as outlined in §30 3 35 of the Utah Code. 
. 8. ' Right of First Refusal: In instances where the children iv ill ut t:d sun lut'Jh < .m 
in excess of four (4) hours or overnight, each party should be allowed the right of first refusal to care 
for the children HI n in ' n 1 1 m IIIIIIIIM HI |ii I III IIIIII 1 HI 11  if minds 11 iativ< s vs \\\ 
do not live with the parent/ and/or babysitters. If either party provides care for the children pursuant 
10 'his paragraph WIIIMI I! I\ IITI1 r-ihn it.uiv""11. d< sijyraic<l "'pjj.iilinii' lime' he/y.he LS not required to 
give make-up time to the other party. 
9. Relocation: 111 the event either party intends to relocate from Summit County, 
he/she should provide the other party at least sixty (60) days written notice of the intent. Neither 
party shall be allowed to relocate with the children without the consent of the other party and without, 
agreeing upon a new custody/parenting time schedule. 
10. Child Support; Petitioner has worked as a certified appraiser of real property in the 
past and can do so again on her own schedule and still be available for the children. Petitioner 
should be able to earn approximately $1,500.00 per month the first year of her business, 
approximately $2,000.00 the second year and thereafter approximately $2,583.00 pr month (or 
$31,000.00) per year. 
Respondent's gross income is $70,000.00 per year, or $5,833.00 per month and child support 
shall be calculated based on Petitioner's $1,500.00 per month income for the first year, $2,000.00 
per month for the second year and $2,583.00 per month thereafter. Accordingly, Respondent's child 
support obligation to Petitioner for the first year is $951.00 per month, for the second year $909.00 
per month and for the third year and thereafter it is $880.00 per month (see Exhibit 2, child support 
worksheets for year 1, year 2 and thereafter using the above-mentioned incomes and the 
parent-time arrangement.) Child support shall be paid by automatic bank to bank transfer, one-
half on the 5th of each month and one-half on the 20th of each month commencing September 5, 
2005. Respondent's child support obligation shall continue until such time as the children attain 
the age of eighteen (18) and graduate from high school with their regularly scheduled classes, 
whichever occurs last. Should the children require child support beyond the scheduled dates 
because of their emotional, physical or intellectual condition, the Petitioner shall bring that before 
the Court for consideration at the time support would otherwise terminate. 
11. Daycare: Each party shall pay one-half of any and all work related daycare costs 
and after school program costs incurred on behalf of the children. The party incurring an out-of-
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pocket work-related expense shall submit to the other party an invoice, receipt and/or bill for the 
expense within thirty (30) days of payment or receiving same and shall be reimbursed h 
party within fifteen (15) days of his/her receipt of those out-of-pocket daycare and after school 
I Extra-Curricular, Summer Camp and Tutoring Expenses: Neither party shall 
i i an extra-curricular activity, tutoring or summer camp, without the other party's 
consent, if the enrollment will affect the other parent's time or finances. Each party shall pay >ite-
ll extra-curricular activity, tutoring and/or summer camp expenses incurred on behalf of the 
children, as long as the expenses are agreed upon, in advance, in wi I intf, by Ik1 p.miM, I hi fuiiv 
incurring a pre-authorized expense should submit to the other party an invoice, receipt and/or bill 
the other party within fifteen (15) days of his/her receipt of those agreed upon extra-curricular or 
i imniir i i iiiii|i i iiiii'ii i III< in i . ICI np fs Jim! mi lu l l1 
13. Healthcare: The party who can obtain medical and dental insurance for the children 
ii din most reasonable cost shall do so, as long as it is available at a reasonable cost. Neither party 
presently has health benefits and the children are insured by CHIP and shall :• Dntini le to be i; i si i < : • 1. 
by 1 HIP until other insurance options are available or CHIP is no longer available. 
Each party shall pay one-half of any and all ; , 
incurred for the medical, mental health, prescriptions, dental, optical, chiropractic and orthodontia 
1
 i I ii' i In H I mi I IMI I IU iiiii I 111 lit mi i pi i i i i i i i i i i i i | i) n i M II II IIJII i iu j i i t f in u*» I IK* party 
incurring an out-of-pocket expense shall submit to the other party an invoice, receipt and/or bill for 
1
 ii »»! p<>< k H i r i n k . i l 11 .ill I! i, prescriptions, dental optical, chiropractic or orthodontia costs 
wiihin thirty (30) days of payment or receiving same and should be reimbursed by the other p,n I \ 
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within fifteen (15) days of his/her receipt of those medical, mental health, dental, optical, 
chiropractic or orthodontia invoices, receipts and/or bills. 
If Petitioner or Respondent fails to submit the children's insurance claims to the insurance 
provider, fails to obtain pre-approval from the insurance company when required, or takes the 
children to a non-covered provider without a referral or the express, written consent of the other 
party (excluding emergency care), he/she shall be solely responsible for any and all costs associated 
therewith. 
The party maintaining insurance on behalf of the children shall provide verification of 
coverage to the other party, upon initial enrollment of the dependent children and thereafter on or 
before February I5'h of each calendar year. The party maintaining the insurance shall also notify 
the other party of any change of insurance carrier, premium or benefits within thirty (30)days of the 
date of the change. The party who has not obtained the insurance shall pay the party who has 
obtained health insurance for the children, one-half of the children's health insurance premium on 
or before the fifth day of the month. 
14. Tax Exemption: Each party shall be allowed to claim one of the children as an 
exemption and dependent on his/her federal and state income tax returns provided, however, if the 
Respondent is not current in payment of child support, day care expenses, medical costs and/or 
health insurance premiums, he shall not claim a child as a tax dependent for any year in which he 
is delinquent and Petitioner shall claim both children as her dependents for tax purposes. When 
there is one dependent remaining, the parties shall alternate claiming that child as a dependent with 
Respondent claiming the child for odd number tax years (i.e., 2009, 2011) and Petitioner claiming 
the child for even numbered tax years (i.e., 2010, 2012) 
If either party will not receive a tax benefit by claiming an exemption as set forth above, the 
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exempt ion shall automatically revert to the other party. 
15. C o n t i n u i n g Life I n s u r a n c e Obl iga t ion : If available at a reasonable cost, each 
party shall obtain and maintain a life insurance policy on his/her life with a death benefit of not less 
sive beneficiaries and the other party as sole 
trustee. The parties ' obligation to maintain life insurance policies shall terminate when David 
I I II l l C i . l i l t ' < t j M I I I M l II In III 1 1 , I I I \ l - I l lllllll | l i i m i i I I I , l II i t II II I! IIII I I I I I Il II II II I I I II l l l l I I I 1 1 1 1 . I l l f i x I I I I V "A H i l l 
its designated beneficiaries and trustee to the other party on or before February 15 th of each year. 
I i fe I n s u r a n c e j>0 |£c£e s : During the marriage, each party acquired a ten i life 
insurance policy. Neither policy has cash value. Each party shall be awarded their individual policy 
as his/her sole and separate property with no claim by the other party. 
Qualified Domest ic Rela t ions O r d e i I " : litionei sha 11 be credited *ith til i. i 
SI 0,000.00 she was awarded pursuant to the t > v f s Order of March 30, 2005. 
in till: nil I ; 1 h ititi : i: n T< if $2, 321 30] >e 
m o n t h for twelve (12) m o n t h s commencing September 1, 2 0 0 5 , $1 ,821.00 per mon th commencing 
Sep t embe r . 06 and S1 .. JO per m o n t h the reah Support shall be paid b y automatic bank 
to bank transfer, one-half on the 5 th of each month and one-half on the 20 t h o f each month. 
If health insurance coverage cannot be obtained and the chi ldren are in need of CHIP 
coverage , the amount will be considered family support . Tf there is insurance coverage available 
o therwise , the amount shall be considered al imony. Support shall b e pa id for the length of the 
•* • u ;ise tf Pet i t ioner 's dies, remarries or cohabits . 
II I ' ii'iull I 'i operty/HousehoIi Il I • n i s h i n g s : Respondent shall be allowed access-
to the par t ies ' h o m e to inventory the personal property within ten (10) days of the da te of trial. The 
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parties shall schedule a time to meet and equally divide their marital property. In the event the 
parties are unable to agree on the personal property division, they shall make a good faith effort to 
resolve the issue with the assistance of a trained family law mediator (at least one session) prior to 
seeking a resolution from the Court. 
20. Separate Property: Each party shall be awarded any and all inheritances and/or gifts 
received by that party prior to the marriage and during the marriage as his/her sole and separate 
property without any claim by the other party. 
21. Vehicles: Petitioner is awarded the 1998 Mercedes ML which has a value of 
approximately SI 3,480.00 with no outstanding obligation, free and clear of any claim of Respondent. 
Respondent is awarded the 1997 Chevrolet Camaro which has a value of approximately 58,673.00 
with no outstanding obligation, free and clear of any claim of Petitioner. The unequal value given 
in favor of Petitioner is fair given the entire circumstances where Respondent 'underpaid' Petitioner 
by inflating his business expenses and paying personal expenses through his business but the Court 
cannot calculate the amount. 
22. Marital Home: The fair market value of the home located at 5794 Kingsford 
Avenue, Park City, Utah is 5450,000.00. The home has an outstanding mortgage of approximately 
S194,000.00 resulting in a net equity of approximately $256,000.00. Each party is awarded one-half 
of the equity, that is $128,000.00 each. Petitioner is awarded the home as her sole property, free and 
clear of any claim of Respondent and she shall be responsible for any and all obligations associated 
with this home. Respondent is awarded an equitable lien in the amount of S128,000.00 against the 
home. Petitioner shall attempt to refinance the mortgage in her own name and remove Respondent 
from the mortgage obligation as soon as possible. If Petitioner is unable to refinance the home 
within three (3) years, the lien shall remain until she can refinance the mortgage or until the youngest 
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child, David, turns eighteen (18). Respondent shall quitclaim his interest in the home to Petitioner 
nayment of the amount of his share of the equity. 
hecking/Savings Accounts: Each party shall be awarded any and all checking and 
by the other party. 
• 24. 2003 fax Refund. 
Respondent's sha i e was awai ded lo Petitioner a s a partial payment of Respondent's share of 
uninsured medical expenses. Petitioner provided evidence of those expenses and the temporary 
award is affirmed. 
25 Investment/Retirement Accounts: During the marriage, the parties acquired 
HI (Min i nl mil mi i l i i n w nl M i i mi 1 ill ii1 nil (nil In llii '. I hr mi HI mi in nil J u l ! In il i i u l n i m II in m l i i l 
as follows: 
a. 
Utah Educational Savings Plan for their minor children and Respondent's two (2) 
children g.om a p r e v j o u s marriage> Bi ian 1 lid lola s Cai sten and Zachary A lien 
Carsten. These were established for the children's further education. Petitioner 
shall be awarded exclusive control and possession over the plans over which she is 
custodian and Respondent shall be awarded exclusive control and possession over 
the plans over which he is custodian. 
b.' Fidelity 401(h) l ' d i h n n n in|) i i i i r i l \\ mb hi I n u fin nf< Ii n II III | " lliii In In i«, i iliii 
at May 23, 2005 of $7,131.00 This is awarded to her free and clear of any claim of 
Ki . ' spo i i i ln i i 
c. Washington Mutual Roth IRA: Petitioner acquired a Washington Mutual Roth IRA 
which has a value at May 31, 2005 of $3,047.00. This is awarded to her free and 
clear of any claim of Respondent. 
d. Varian 401 (k)\ Respondent acquired a Varian Medical Systems 401 (k) Retirement 
Account which had a value as of June 30, 2005 of $91,479.00. Pursuant to the 
Order dated March 30,2005 Petitioner was awarded $ 10,000.00 of this as an advance 
to re-start her appraisal business. She shall receive the $10,000.00 to enable her 
to restart her appraisal business and the remaining $81,479.00 shall be divided 
equally between the parties. 
26. Uptown Appraisal Group, Inc. Petitioner did have a business known as Uptown 
Appraisal Group, Inc. However, the name was taken over by Respondent who used it for his 
business, Uptown Applications Group. There are no assets or liabilities to this business. Petitioner 
desires to restart her appraisal business. Whatever nominal assets there are associated with this 
business and the name, Uptown Appraisal Group, Inc. are shall be awarded to Petitioner as her sole 
and separate property and she shall hold Respondent harmless therefrom. 
27. Business Optimalization Systems and Services, Inc. Respondent has created a 
business known as Business Optimalization Systems and Services, Inc. Respondent shall be 
awarded this business together with all of its assets and liabilities, as his sole and separate property 
and shall hold Petitioner harmless therefrom. 
28. Marital Debts: At the time that the parties separated in October, 2003, they agreed 
to a division of their personal property and savings and neither party was left with any marital debt. 
Since separation, each of the parties has acquired debt. Each shall be responsible to pay and hold 
the other harmless from their own debts and obligations incurred by his/her since October, 2003. 
29. Undisclosed Debts: If other joint debts are later discovered and not divided between 
10 
the parties herein, the person incurring tiic drhi is solely ic^poH .illr llvn pjymcnl ill" icof -m-l ir> 
ordered to hold the other party harmless therefrom hi addition, the party incurring the debt shall 
inform the creditor of his/her responsibility to pay the joint debt and k«n,qp tli r nr-dilni mlnrmf I <»f 
the parties' current addresses for purposes of notification. 
Since the date of separation, Petitioner has incurred debts of approximately 
approximately 548,000.00. Each party shall 
assume and pay those debts accumulated by his/her from the date of separation, October, 2003. The 
a. The party obligated to pay a debt is ordered to send a copy of this Order 
to each joint creditor informing them ml I In I IUJHIIUJI p m ilni 
debt. 
b. The party obligated to pay a debt is ordered to notify each joint creditor 
of each party's separate address for purposes of notification. 
c. The party obligated to pay a debt is ordered to inform the joint creditor 
il I in. 11 i in In [Mil y i» rnlitlr ml In nvr ivf in i I i vi ih id tjfniinih lioiiun mil 
and correspondence required by law or by the terms of the contract. 
111 111111111 11, 11 il L 111111 ii11 1 111 (/ I t ' l l ! "I i 11 il l i t I I 1 1 111 i i i i l l il 111' r i li v 11 II 11 n o 
negative credit report or other exchange of credit history or 
repayment practices may be made regarding the joint: debt in jless the 
creditor has first made a demand for payment on the part) who was not 
required to pay the debt. 
d. MN p'Mii-i "K M '" "ji "M i.i'ti'1, my creditor for medical expenses provided 
to the minor children that a claim for unpaid medical and dental expenses 
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may not be made against a party who has paid in full his/her share of the 
medical and dental expenses required to be paid by that party. 
31. Attorney's Fees and Costs: Respondent is ordered to pay Petitioner the sum of 
$10,000.00 for attorney's fees and judgment is entered against him for $10,000.00. 
32. Outstanding Medical Expenses: Petitioner has incurred medical expenses for the 
minor children of $1,574.64 for the period October, 2004 through July, 2005 over and above the 
medical expenses she received through reimbursement ofRespondent's one-half of the 2003 income 
tax refund. Respondent owes Petitioner the sum of $787.33 as his one-half of these expenses and 
judgment is hereby entered against him for this sum. 
33. Execution and Delivery of Documents: Each party shall execute and deliver to the 
other any and all documents necessary to carry out the terms contained herein immediately upon the 
entry of this Order or earlier as agreed upon by the parties. These documents include, but are not 
limited to quit claim deeds, auto titles, IRS documents, etc. 
DATED and signed this £/^day of Fri /' (&d<A ' , 200i 
THE COURT: 
/ 7 ^ l l l f f / , , , , 
'* O % 
Brace C. Lubeck 
District Court Judge 
niiiunm^ 
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MEMORANDUM DECISION 
Case Ii H i-JLjtn)2i>5 
H o n o r a b l e BRUCE C. LUBECK 
DATE: A u g u s t 1 9 , 2005 
The above m a t t e r came b e f o r e t h e c o u r t f o r a b e n c h t r i a l on 
A u g u s t 1 1 , 12 a n d 17, 2 0 0 5 . P e t i t i o n e r was p r e s e n t w i t h David S . 
D o l o v / i t z and R e s p o n d e n t was p r e s e n t w i t l i C h r i s t i n a I n g e M i l l e r 
and Summer S h e l t o n . 
BACKGROUND 
P e t i t i o n e r f i l e d a c o m p l a i n t f o r d i v o r c e on Movembe> 
2 0 0 3 . If" a l l e g e d the p a r t i e s were m a r r i e d June 22, 1991 , and 
ihrii t h e y had two c h i l d r e n , Gran t , bo rn Oc tobe r 23, 1996, ,ni.i 
David, bo rn March i u , i y * 1 . The complaint , s o u g h t an e q u i t a b l e 
d i v i s i o n of p r o p e r t y , c h i l d s u p p o r t and al imony, and c u s t o d y of 
t h e c h i l d r e n and o t h e r r e l i e f . She a l s o fi l ed a mot ion for 
t e m p o r a r y r e l i e f t h a t same d a t e . 
An answer was f i l e d December 18, 2003. Respondent a l s o 
opposed t h e r e q u e s t for t emporary o r d e r s and moved f o r an order 
t o show cause on J a n u a r y 20, 2004. A hear i i lg was he1 • 7, 
2004 . Tl le court o idt - r^d, M summary, on a t empora ry b a s i s , t h a t 
p e t i t i o n e r have s o l e c u s t o d y of t h e c h i l d r e i I willi parent; time for 
r e s p o n d e n t , a mutual r e s t r a i n i n g o r d e r was e n t e r e d as t o 
d i s c u s s i n g t h e m a r r i a g e w i t h t h e c h i l d r e n and d i s s i p a t i n g or 
e n c u m b e r i n g a s s e t s , p e t i t i o n e r was a l lowed t o u s e t h e m a r i t a l 
home, a c u s t o d y e v a l u a t i o n was d e n i e d , a second m o r t g a g e was t o 
be t a k e n out on t h e m a r i t a l home, r e s p o n d e n t was r e q u i r e d to pay 
one h a l f h i s income t o p e t i t i o n e r for f ami ly s u p p o r t and p rov ide 
a mon th ly a c c o u n t i n g , a v o c a t i c n a l a s s e s s m e n t was o r d e r e d for 
b o t h p a r t i e s , i n s u r a n c e was t o c o n t i n u e , and o t h e r i s s u e s were 
r e s e r v e d . An o r d e r was s i g n e d June 29, 2004. 
S h o r t l y a f t e r t h e h e a r i n g p e t i t i o n e r moved f o r an o r d e r of 
c o n t e m p t on v a r i o u s i s s u e s . L a t e r r e sponden t f i l e d a r e q u e s t for 
an o r d e r t o show cause why p e t i t i o n e r shou ld n o t be he ld i n 
c o n t e m p t en v a r i o u s i s s u e s . 
P e t i t i o n e r on December 10, 2004, moved f o r a b i f u r c a t e d 
d i v o r c e . On February 28 , 2005, t h e p a r t i e s s t i p u l a t e d to t h e 
b i f u r c a t e d d i v o r c e and t h e c o u r t i s s u e d a n o t h e r t e m p o r a r y o rder 
r e l a t i n g t o t h e i s s u e s and t h i s t r i a l d a t e was f i x e d . 
The b i f u r c a t e d d e c r e e was e n t e r e d March 2 3 , 2 0 0 5 , nunc pre 
tunc t o December 3 1 , 2004 . 
In an o rde r of March 30, 2005 , t h e r e q u e s t s f o r contempt 
w e r e r e s e r v e d for t r i a l and e v i d e n t i a r y p r e s e n t a t i o n , t ax refunds 
w e r e d i v i d e d , and a r e t i r e m e n t w i t h d r a w a l was a l l o w e d . 
On June 23 , 2005, p e t i t i o n e r a g a i n moved f o r s a n c t i o n s and 
a t t o r n e y f ee s and c o s t s r e l a t i n g t o t h e o r d e r r e l a t i n g t o 
. 1 . 
re t i rement 1 hdrawal allnwpd previoi isly. No response to that 
motion was . i i •-• i P--I . : . . 1 . Ar1 i n i t i a l p a r t i a l QDRO was 
signed by the cour t August 9, 2005. 
The court heard evidence, received e x h i b i t s including a 
depos i t i on , heard argument ul counsel, .nul J - lulLy ,idvi:.. d. 
The court wil l , where appropr ia te , adopt the proposed 
f indings of f ac t of p e t i t i o n e r (PFF) or respondent (RFF) and 
r e f e r to those as numbered by the p a r t i e s . 
The court f inds as follows: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The cou r t f inds in acconl < ith Mi I- 4. 
2. As to the ch i ld ren , the court makes some a d d i t i o n a l 
f i nd ings , based on the testimony and otherwise , TIle court 
r e a l i z e s some of these "f indings" are r e a l l y IIi the nature of 
somewhat rambling conclusions, but they a re included here as a 
b a s i s for the c o u r t ' s decision and thought processes and the 
cour t f inds them to be t r ue . 
The coiiit b e l i e v e s Ulat Ule i s sues surrounding custody are 
based on the pe r cep t i ons of the p a r t i e s regarding the chi ldren, 
the needs of the • ::I :i i ] dr« =?i I a i Id 11 Ie par t i es ' v i ews as t:o how to 
b e s t deal with the ch i ld ren . 
3. The cou r t i m d s each par ty loves and cares for U leir 
children and each wants to act in the best interests of the 
children. The parties simply cannot agree on what that is. The 
two children in this case are on the autism spectrum, though the 
court believes neither has been formally diagnosed "autistic." 
Even if there is such a diagnosis, the "syndrome" is on a 
spectrum. Each parent believes his or her own approach is the 
right way and the best for the children but the court finds and 
concludes in fact that there is no "right" way to deal with the 
children in this case, or any children for that matter, but only 
a perceived right way. There is no one medically or 
scientifically or psychologically "right" way to deal with 
children with autism spectrum, despite the firmly held beliefs of 
a particular parent, and there is no one answer that fits all 
children on the autism spectrum. The process is as with many 
other of life's challenges, to find some way, as best one can, 
that works for the children and stick with it and press on and 
take one day at a time. The court cannot solve the problems 
associated with a disagreement by parents about how to treat 
children with special needs. Professionals disagree, teachers 
disagree, as do parents, and others disagree, on how to best 
raise children in general, and how to raise children with special 
needs. Here, the process is more complicated because the court 
does not believe it has a full enough picture of these children 
as the facts show school work at an acceptable level but there 
.4. 
are other behaviors and issues that complicate that picture. 
4. "Autism" is a label attached to many behaviors but it 
involves many facets of a child's life. It is not medically or 
psychologically well understood nor is there one solution or 
ansv/er to the issues that arise in the life of a child on the 
autism spectrum nor the parents of that child. Many parents see 
a panacea or a final solution and there are none currently. 
Research and further study continue to be necessary to try to 
solve the problems associated v/ith a child on the autism 
spectrum. Autism can manifest itself in behavior as well as 
medically and emotionally. 
5. The "regimen" desired by petitioner may be effective for 
the children, but it is simply one way to approach the problems 
associated with children on the autism spectrum. The medical 
doctor, Bryan Jepson, M.D., from whom petitioner takes much of 
her counsel, believes in a diet plan that involves basically 
avoiding grains and dairy products, though the court realizes it 
is more involved than that (gluten free and casein free). 
Education is involved as well. Other food supplements are used. 
Dr. Jepson admits his methods are not accepted by the majority o 
the medical community and are experimental, not in the sense tha 
the children are "guinea pigs" but in the sense that the methods 
he espouses are not tested by the scientific method nor have the 
methods been subjected to peer review nor are they universally 
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accepted, as if anything is universally accepted. That is not a 
criticism of Dr. Jepson or petitioner. If those things work for 
the children they should be pursued. However, respondent cannot 
be faulted nor kept from the lives of the children because he 
sides with the majority of professionals, or even simply 
disagrees with Dr. Jepson and petitioner, that .such a dietary 
regimen is not necessary nor productive. It is subjective as to 
whether the children are behaving "better,'' engage in more or 
less self-stimulating behavior and so on. While a mother such as 
petitioner most certainly cannot be discounted when she says she 
can observe changes after visits with respondent, the complexity 
of the situation does not allow the court to simply say 
respondent is wrong because he does not follow a particular diet. 
One party may see worse behavior and the other party not see such 
a phenomenon. That does not mean one party is right and the 
other wrong. The court fully credits the abilities and sincerity 
of petitioner and her efforts and time spent with and for the 
children, but simply finds that the way she has chosen, and the 
way she thinks is best for the children, is net necessarily the 
only viable, legitimate way to deal with the issues surrounding 
the children. 
The court cannot and does not find the nbest" or vvright" way 
to deal with these issues. Lacking agreement of the parties, 
however, the court is required to consider the best interests of 
-6-
the children and order something that is an attempt to accomplish 
the goal of having a custody arrangement that best meets those 
needs of the children, whatever the wishes of the parents. 
6. Consistency and structure are important for these 
children, as it is for all children. Divorce is clearly a 
stressor in their lives, as well as the lives of everyone 
involved. Moving is a stressor. A change of grades and teachers 
at school or an unkind bully are stressors. As the court wrote 
in May, 2004, u . . . Each party should cooperate and communicate 
with the other as they are seemingly doing now. . . That 
includes the dietary needs of the children and there should be 
information given to each by the professionals, chiefly medical 
and psychological and social, and each party should follow those 
recommendations carefully without regard to the individual 
beliefs of the parties. Each should respect the views of the 
other party, but unless and until there is some agreement, the 
parties are to follow the recommendations of the above experts. 
Substantial variations from parent to parent, despite legitimate 
differing views on what the children[s'] need, are not 
acceptable. . . Each should communicate, . . . on all major 
decisions affecting the children with the view in mind that 
indeed the children are the first priority with each party/' 
7. The court finds and concludes that it is important for 
the children to maintain whatever dietary and social and therapy 
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and educational regimens as seems most appropriate for them, 
based on the opinions of first the parents and then the 
professionals. In such situations, the parents are really, the 
court finds and concludes, in a better position than the 
professionals to champion the child and determine what is working 
to the children's benefit and what is not. Previously in May, 
2004, the court opined that professionals advice should be 
followed. That was stated in the context of a belief that the 
parties were not agreeing on the care of the children. The court 
believes .these parents know in a greater and more fundamental 
way, better than Dr. Jepson, better than school teachers, better 
than any other doctor, and certainly better than this court, what 
is best for the children. Even if they cannot agree on what that 
is, it is important that they not be at cross-purposes. While 
the court perhaps cannot change their minds, for example, as to 
whether a gluten free/casein free diet is essential to the well 
being of these children, the court intends to attempt to require 
the parents/parties to fully realize the importance of working 
together for the benefit of the children. The court cannot 
possibly determine whether that diet, along with other 
supplements, is really what is right for these children or what 
is best for these children. The court finds and concludes the 
parties must work together to determine that, set aside their 
personal opinions and desires and pride, and work toward the 
-8-
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common good of the children. 
8. While the court observed some disturbing things during 
the trial, as far minor "outbursts" and reactions to testimony, 
and what appeared to be coaching of witnesses by petitioner, 
snide "snickering" when the other testified, and vocal and voice 
inflection criticism by respondent of the decisions of the other 
party while testifying, the court also observed genuine love and 
caring for the children, by each party. That love was expressed 
in court and in emotion and the court sees much love shown in the 
conduct of the parents toward the children. However, love spoken 
by a parent who then "beats" the child every day or two may still 
be lcve, but it is a different love than what is shown by a 
person who does not beat the child. (Obviously the court is not 
implying in any way that this case involves any such thing as a 
"beating," nor that either party "beats" the children. The 
comments are used only to illustrate the court's thinking 
relative to the support issues discussed below.) 
The court finds and concludes and believes the parties can 
work together and should work together with the purpose that the 
children will benefit. To the extent petitioner believes 
respondent is hurting the children by a failure to comply with 
her desired regimen, the court believes that lack of diligence 
should end by respondent unless respondent has some other course 
of treatment that the parties can agree upon. However, on 
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balance, the court finds that it is of more benefit to the 
children to have both parents in their lives than it is to have a 
particular diet or treatment regimen, no matter how strongly one 
party feels about that diet or regimen. While the court is aware 
that love and hugs alone cannot overcome many "autistic" 
behaviors, the court believes a child on the autism spectrum (or 
any child) cannot have too many people in his life that love him, 
and spend time with him and do things with him. 
9. The court accepts the subjective observations of the 
parties, but from the testimony and common sense, the children 
and their conditions are too "multi-factorial" (in the words of 
Dr. Jepson) to be able to isolate a "symptom" of increase self-
stimulation, for example, after eating something not on the 
"allowed" diet. Behavior is simply more complex than that where 
special needs children are involved and behavior cannot be solely 
tied to an instance of failure of diet. 
10. None of this is a criticism nor is it profound wisdom, 
and the court believes it is mostly common sense and experience, 
but the above comments are largely a background and serve as a 
basis for the court's finding and conclusion that there ought to 
be joint legal custody, with primary physical custody being 
awarded to petitioner but with ample physical custody to 
respondent. The court will further explain the reasons for that 
less-than-equal physical custody in a discussion of the payment 
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of support by respondent. 
The court finds the parties can work together and it is in 
the best interests of the children to have joint legal custody. 
The court finds that petitioner has been the primary party 
involved in raising the children, and respondent was working full 
time and providing the finances. The court finds, and the 
parties agree, that respondent has been involved in the lives of 
the children in the past when the parties were together. The 
court finds and believes that each party will give first priority 
to the welfare of the children, reach shared decisions, and each 
can encourage a relationship with the other parent. There have 
been serious disagreements about various child-rearing issues in 
the past but the court finds the parties can, and must, overcome 
those past disagreements. 
11. Unless the parties agree otherwise, the court finds it 
is in the best interests of the children that they be with 
petitioner approximately 70% of the time and with respondent 30?> 
of the time. Again, the court will make findings and discuss 
why, despite the court's comments above, that time is not more 
equally shared. The court will not attempt to set a schedule but 
it should be regular and ongoing with the time allocated year 
round. 
12. The court finds in accord with the last sentence of RFF 
5 including the parenting plan proposed by respondent, RFF 6, PFF 
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8, RFF 8, RFF 9, RFF 11 and RFF 12. 
13. Petitioner has worked as a certified appraiser of real 
property in the past and could do so again on her own schedule 
and be available for the children yet she can earn an income. 
Based on the testimony, the court finds petitioner should be 
imputed an income of $31,000 per year, or $2583 per month. While 
higher figures could be imputed, those higher possible incomes 
assume facts the court cannot accept. The ability to earn an 
income from appraising assumes a client base, and assumes the 
ability to work long hours. Petitioner has been earning some 
money and borrowing some money. With this job she can work from 
the home on a flexible schedule and accomplish many of the goals 
set for the children, yet be earning a reasonable income. 
14. Respondent was ordered to pay one half his "income" to 
petitioner during the pendency of this case, from May 2004 to the 
present trial. A great deal of testimony was elicited about 
various facets of respondent's income and expenses, and in his 
testimony he admitted and agreed that he was willing to pay 
"more" because he did not understand exactly what was required 
and some of his "deductions" could be eliminated. He voluntarily 
eliminated some of his expenses before trial. His counsel 
characterized this as generous and fair and equitable. 
15. The court does not intend to go through each and every 
expense category and determine whether the expense was a 
legitimate expense in arriving at what his income was for 
purposes of support. The court has examined the exhibits and 
considered the testimony carefully and has determined that the 
court is incapable, as are the accountants except by way of 
opinion, of determining exactly what his "true" income was during 
the pendency of this case. The court heard experts in this case 
and has heard many accounting experts. Accounting is not an 
exact science by any means and varying conclusions can be and 
often are drawn by qualified CPAs. 
The statutory definition of gross income from self 
employment is well known, and it is arrived at by subtracting 
necessary expenses required for self employment from gross 
receipts. The court is to review those and only necessary 
expenses may be deducted from gross receipts. Tax purposes do not 
govern. Here, the court finds respondent has not paid half his 
income and has overstated his reasonable and necessary expenses 
and that has resulted in an under payment to petitioner for 
family support. The court cannot and does not, however, attempt 
to calculate what the amount is. The court believes on balance 
the court's only solution is go forward from this point. 
16. The court finds that while respondent loves the children 
as discussed above, for some reason, perhaps dissatisfaction with 
petitioner or perhaps simple greed or some other unsatisfactory 
or base motive, he has not fully supported them as he could have 
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during the pendency of this case. The court cannot and does not 
equate that the hypothetical "beatings" discussed above, but the 
sheer weight of the lack of support and all that encompasses as 
far as an attitude or mind set, overcomes, in the mind of the 
court, the great expressed love of respondent. 
Whatever the calculations involved, respondent certainly 
took almost every advantage he could to "deduct" from his gross 
receipts what he calls necessary expenses before paying half that 
to petitioner.. The court is not at all impressed that an 
accountant "approved" the deductions or that it is legal as far 
as taxes, or that it is permissible. In fact it was not 
"accountant approved" in any event as the accountant for 
respondent told respondent what was permissible and then 
respondent gave figures to the accountant, who assumed the 
honesty and good will of respondent. The court does not engage 
in that same presumption based on the testimony received and the 
exhibits examined carefully by the court. The deductions in this 
case involve a practice the court greatly faults and as a result, 
in part, respondent is not given more parent time as it appears 
that it may not be in the best interests of the children as the 
court is less certain than it would otherwise be that he has the 
best interests of the children at heart in his very core and 
heart. He seems capable and caring, but these economic issues 
cause the court to be somewhat wary of his true commitment to the 
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children. He had a chance to prove his love for his children by 
supporting them and giving them all he possibly could, not by 
giving them half of what the definition of "income" allows 
according to accounting principles. He could have done far more 
than he did, whatever the amount "should" have been, and he 
failed to do that. That speaks loudly to the court, more loudly 
than his expressed love. Instead, he deducted and expensed almost 
every conceivable item from gross receipts and then paid support 
from that income. While he may have done that because of his 
feelings, or lack of feelings, toward petitioner, and out of 
frustration and bitterness or ill will, it could have, and almost 
certainly did, have consequences for the children. As a further 
comment on respondent's payments, petitioner's records show he 
paid just under $600 per month since early 2004. The exhibits 
show respondent calculated, seemingly to the very penny, half of 
what he perceived to be his income. Several checks are in the 
amount of $210.39 with the notation "H pay check." Most checks 
paid to petitioner bear that notation. The checks written to 
petitioner, even in a self-employment situation in a start-up 
business, show respondent wrote the checks for $163.63, $25.98, 
$44.16, and on and on. Very, very few checks were in an even 
amount but were calculated, as noted, to the penney, evidently 
being careful not to "overpay" for the benefit of the children. 
In total, and in sum, the entire phenomenon of this "income" 
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and "necessary expenses" was distasteful to the court as it was 
presented. Giving respondent every benefit of the doubt, and 
realizing he paid for some things not set forth by petitioner, 
the court believes this action belies to some extent respondent's 
claimed good motives. The legal definition of income is what it 
is, but that does not mean a parent claiming to love his children 
must use the sharpest pencil and even sharper business practice 
to calculate his expenses to take those from the gross receipts 
and thus pay less for support for the children. There were two 
months when respondent paid absolutely nothing for support, yet 
had gross receipts. The court cannot imagine what respondent 
must have been thinking, other than, as mentioned, his distaste 
for petitioner or his greed, when he would travel, eat out, buy-
items, and then not pay anything for the benefit of the children. 
His expressed, and demonstrated, love for the children is 
somewhat belied by the perhaps legal but unsavory "accounting" 
principles utilized. It is particularly surprising given that 
the court credits respondent with being very generous at trial in 
agreeing to certain aspects financially that do not favor him. 
The court believes and concludes that as trial approached 
respondent realized fully what he had been doing, cheating the 
children. 
17. The court finds that while small amounts may not mean 
much economically, they are very telling to the court about an 
-16-
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attitude of respondent. Again, the court finds and believes 
fully respondent appears to be well intentioned and sincere about 
his love for the children, and he wants them and needs them in 
his life, but he let other factors get in the way of being more 
generous and fair than he could have during the pendency of this 
case. He felt it necessary to deduct, for example, $15 for 
parking fees, when that measly and minor $15 could have been used 
for the boys to have a small gift or treat of some kind. He 
deducted car washes, all available mileage, all accounting fees, 
paid his adult sons from a previous marriage a directors fee in 
total of $3000 (but did not claim this as an expense), paid those 
same adult sons wages over $7500, many, many meals including 
meals for, as an example, $162 and $137 at Costco (the court's 
experience at Costco is that one can enjoy hotdogs and pizza but 
little else by way of meals there), office supplies, flights that 
are questionable, postage, and other expenses. Again, without 
attempting to determine specifically any legitimate expense, and 
without suggesting that any particular item is or is not a 
necessary expense to be deducted from gross receipts, the entire 
picture shows a person more interested in paying as little as he 
can for family support. It certainly, beyond question, does not 
show a person willing to pay what ever he can to make the lives 
of his children better and more enjoyable. When asked how he 
thought petitioner and the children could make it with such small 
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amounts of support, his answer was a rather, to the court, 
cavalier response that she seemed to have made it. The court 
does not enjoy denigrating respondent, as he seems to have many, 
many good qualities, but these observations and conclusions play 
a large part in the court's perception of ]ust how dedicated a 
father respondent is. 
18. Respondent, since being released from his salaried ]ob 
in 2002, has been involved in a self-employed business consulting 
operation. Since the beginning of 2004 until July 2005 his gross 
receipts have amounted to approximately $70,000. The court has 
had a very difficult time calculating the gross receipts. 
Respondent claims the amount he grossed was just over $53,000, 
and petitirner set forth an analysis showing over $90,000,
 yet 
that clearly included udcuble counting" based on transfers from 
one account to another. There was simply no compelling or 
convincing evidence as to what respondent has eained and so the 
court has done the best it can, believing each party has 
presented the evidence in their own favor and the truth is likely 
in the middle somewhere. He has paid support in that time in the 
sum of just over $12,000, or under $600 per month, and as noted, 
in two months he paid zero. He claims his "income," after 
necessary expenses, has been just over $10,000. The court finds 
that his income, deducting necessary expenses, has been more than 
that but the court cannot determine what it has been. For that 
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reason, the court is not requiring any repayment. 
The court received the testimony and exhibit of Mr. Robert 
Derber. While the court has considered it in principle, the 
court does not base any calculations on the testimony. As noted, 
the court has not calculated any amounts owing. The opinion was 
not of great value as clearly what is a necessary expense is 
somewhat subjective and is based on whether something was 
genuinely business related at least as far as tax law is 
concerned. The opinion was not relied on but the testimony of 
respondent and his accountant were considered more strongly. Even 
those were completely unconvincing to the court that all of the 
expenses were necessary, whether an item v/as depreciated, 
amortized, or deducted in the year of acquisition. Again, the 
most important factor is not whether the law or accounting 
principles allow a billiard table to be deducted, or a meal at 
Costco, or certain mileage, or anything else. The important 
factor is that respondent believed he should or could deduct an 
item, rather than simply pay money for his children's benefit. 
He did not do so and that fact and factor weighs far more heavily 
in the court's mind than any amounts that may be past due for 
failing to abide by the May, 2004 order. The picture presented is 
of a man who realizes the law is what it is and sets out to earn 
money and see how little he can pay to his family based on the 
expenses he deems necessary. If that is too harsh, it most 
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certainly does not present a picture of a man who sets out to see 
how much he can benefit his children by paying all he can 
possibly pay. Based on that in part, the court is not awarding 
equal parent time. The court does not believe the conduct is 
contemptuous under the law. The court, again, does not and will 
not attempt to determine what amounts may be due. 
19. The court finds respondent in the past has earned 
$107,000 in 2000, $110,000 in 2001, $144,000 in 2002, $21,000 in 
2003, as shown in IRS filings. Respondent has, as mentioned, been 
involved in a consulting business since 2002. The court has a 
difficult time with imputing income to respondent. He testified 
he was fired from his best paying job in 2002, but there was 
testimony he was fired for reasons other than poor performance. 
Thus, his position that he cannot get a job, despite what: the 
court finds to be good efforts and many applications, is 
weakened. The court finds he is capable of being an engineer 
manager, despite his claims that being fired in 2002 has 
"poisoned the well" and made it impossible for him to obtain such 
a position. The court has more trouble, however, finding his 
underemployment is voluntary. He has applied at a great number 
of businesses. The court finds he was fired and lost his health 
insurance, and that it was not his choice to leave Varian. The 
court accepts that respondent has applied for numerous jobs. 
However, his historical earnings are the best indicator of his 
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ability to earn an income and the court cannot find or conclude 
that the present self-employment is the most economically 
productive at present but it may readily turn into an income more 
in line with what he has earned from employment in the past. 
Based on history and the expert testimony, the court imputes an 
income, based on that finding, of $70,000 per year, or $5833 per 
month. Child support should be calculated on those amounts with 
joint legal custody and the physical custody arrangement set 
forth above. The court finds that support should be in effect as 
set forth in the last paragraph of RFF 13. The court is of the 
belief, without the benefit of any testimony, that if the 
children are still considered disabled in some way when they turn 
age 18, Supplemental Security Income (SSI) will be available to 
them. If not, they will not need the additional support at that 
time. Further, the court believes it is too speculative to 
determine at this point that they will need additional support in 
ten or twelve years. If that eventuality occurs it can be raised 
at that time. 
20. The court adopts RFF 14 and 15. 
21. The court adopts RFF 16. The evidence presented by 
petitioner shows a considerable amount of expenses for the 
children, but it is not clear what amount of that would be 
covered by a traditional health care policy. The insurance 
aspect of this case is most troubling. The court would like to 
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make sure the children have a viable alternative for insurance, 
but the court cannot impute income to petitioner merely so she 
can obtain CHIP coverage nor can the court structure support 
solely for the benefit of petitioner and the children at the 
expense of respondent. 
22. The court adopts RFF 17. 
23. The court adopts RFF 19, except the amount of insurance 
should be $250,000, and the court adopts RFF 20. 
24. As to alimony, the court finds that petitioner can earn 
as indicated after a period of time. The court believes that she 
cannot earn $2583 per month initially as she still has needs for 
equipment to re-start her business and it will take time to 
reestablish that income level. She needs to seek and obtain 
clients. There was testimony from petitioner that she needs 
$10,000 to obtain the necessary equipment and supplies to re-
start her business but there was testimony from others that $3000 
could start an appraisal business. Given that petitioner was 
previously involved in the appraisal business, the court finds 
that $5000 is sufficient to re-start her business and that she 
has some equipment purchased with funds that have created debt. 
The court is not finding fault with either party with 
respect to following the previous order releasing $10,000 from a 
retirement fund. The evidence about delays was from counsel and 
the court cannot make any credibility determinations from that. 
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That QDRO v/as signed by the court, after agreement, on August 9, 
2005. That $10,000 was previously ordered,on March 30, 2005, is 
to be credited to petitioner. That order will not be disturbed 
but all other offsets and debits or credits during the pendency 
of this case are not calculated or found. 
25. Petitioner claims her needs are $4346 per month but that 
with additional needs for the children, those would be $5521. The 
court finds petitioner's needs per month to be $3821, not 
including the extras for the children that include therapy, 
vitamins and special food and National Ability Center activities. 
The court reduces the amounts in the areas of food, internet, 
clothing, medical, school, auto maintenance, and camps. The court 
finds petitioner can earn approximately $1500 per month the first 
year of her business, the sum of approximately $2000 the second 
year and thereafter the amount imputed. 
26. Respondent claims personal expenses of $3051 per month 
and business expenses of $1865. The court reduces the personal 
expenses in the areas of food, medical, incidentals, other child 
related expenses, and support of college age children and gifts 
and finds his personal expenses are $2250 per month, and business 
expenses are reduced to $1565, and the court finds that business 
expenses are higher during the start up of a business and 
anticipates that those amounts will decrease. 
27. Based on that analysis respondent is to pay to 
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petitioner the sum of $2321 per month for one year, $1821 for the 
next year, and thereafter the sum of $1238 as support. If 
insurance cannot be obtained and the children are in need of CHIP 
coverage, the amount will be considered family support. If there 
is insurance coverage available otherwise, the amount is alimony. 
This support is to end at the usual triggers of length of 
marriage or remarriage or cohabitation or death. The court, 
again, cannot foresee that there will be need in ten or more 
years beyond what is the usual and normal. 
28. The court finds in accord with the first paragraph of 
RFF 22 and RFF 23. 
29. The court finds in accord with PFF 26. The unequal value 
of the vehicles, petitioner's being worth more than respondent's, 
is fair given the entire circumstances where the court fully 
believes respondent "underpaid" petitioner but the court cannot 
calculate the amount. Any inequality of value should be given in 
favor of petitioner and the court intentionally does not equalize 
the value of the vehicles. 
30. The court finds the parties acquired a home at 5794 
Kingsford Ave, Park City, Utah. The testimony about the value of 
the home varied from petitioner's expert at $420,000 to 
respondent's experts, who opined the value of the home was at 
least $475,000, but that the home should be listed for sale at 
between $500,000 and $520,000. All experts were good and had 
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their strong points but petitioner's expert has greater 
experience at formal evaluations, he evaluated the inside of the 
home, and respondent's experts based a great deal of their 
opinions on the optimistic view that there has never been a 
better seller's market than now. On balance, the home is found 
to have a fair market value of $450,000, with an outstanding 
mortgage of approximately $194,000 resulting in a net equity of 
approximately $256,000. The court values the equity at the time 
of trial seeing no compelling reason to choose the time of 
separation. While petitioner paid the mortgage payments during 
the pendency of this case, and while respondent did not pay much 
toward support, market factors increased the value of the home, 
not payments. The home is clearly marital property. The equal 
share of the equity for each party is $128,000. Petitioner is 
awarded the home subject to any and all liability thereon, as her 
sole property and respondent is given an equitable lien in the 
amount of $128,000. The court finds it is important that the 
children have as much stability as possible. That is not unique 
to this case. Divorce accompanied by a quick move is very 
difficult on children and if the children in this case, and any 
case, can stay in the marital home they are most often better 
off. If that cannot happen it is one of the inevitable 
consequences of divorce. 
Petitioner should seek to refinance the mortgage in her own 
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name and remove respondent as soon as possible. If she is not 
successful at that within three years, the lien may remain until 
she can refinance or until the youngest child, David, turns 18. 
The lien amount is given as a judgment. Respondent is to 
quitclaim his interest upon payment of the amount of equity. 
31. The court finds in accord with RFF 26. 
32. The court finds in accord with PFF 29. 
33. The court finds in accord with PFF 30 as to retirement 
accounts, which are marital property. It is too speculative for 
the court to attempt to anticipate whether another distribution 
of these funds will affect CHIP eligibility. 
34. The court finds in accord with PFF 31 and 32. 
35. The court finds in accord with PFF 33 and 34 and RFF 34, 
and that petitioner has incurred debt in the approximate sum of 
$18,000 and respondent has incurred debt in the approximate sum 
of $48,000 since the separation. 
36. As to attorney fees, each party has incurred substantial 
fees. The court finds respondent did not fairly calculate his 
gross receipts from self employment and the necessary expenses 
thereon, but rather, as found and discussed above, took every 
opportunity to pay as little family support as possible. The 
court did not attempt to calculate that amount. However, each 
party is to receive half of the retirement account and each has 
an ability to pay the bulk of their own attorney fees. 
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ADD 38 
Respondent is to pay $10,000 to petitioner for attorney fees. The 
court is not finding that amount was understated or underpaid by 
respondent as to his income but because of the court's expressed 
displeasure at the entire scenario the court believes respondent 
should be required to pay that amount as and for attorney fees to 
petitioner. That can offset the $10,000 retirement fund advance 
to petitioner. 
37. The court finds in accord with PFF 37, the first 
numbered 37 dealing with medical expenses. 
38. The court finds in accord with RFF 36. 
39. The parties assets are to be divided as discussed above. 
Based on the above findings and discussion, the court makes 
the following: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The court has jurisdiction over the parties and subject 
matter and venue is proper. 
2. It is reasonable and proper that custody and parent time 
be awarded in accord with the above findings of fact. 
3. It is reasonable and proper that the parties assets, 
debts and liabilities be distributed in accord with the above 
findings of fact. 
4. It is reasonable and proper for an order supplementing 
the bifurcated decree of divorce be issued consistent with these 
findings. 
Petitioner is to.prepare an order in compliance with URCP, 
Rule 7(f) setting forth this ruling. 
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BY THE''COURT: . 
BRUCE C. LUBECK 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
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